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Social norms are ubiquitous in human life. Their role is essential in allowing cooperation 
to prevail, despite the presence of incentives to free ride. As far as norm enforcement 
devices are concerned, it would be impossible to have widespread social norms if second 
parties only enforced them. However, both the quantitative relevance and the motivations 
underlying altruistic punishment on the part of ‘unaffected’ third parties are still largely 
unexplored. This paper contributes to shed light on the issue, by means of an experimental 
design consisting of three treatments: a Dictator Game Treatment, a Third-Party 
Punishment Game Treatment (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) and a Metanorm Treatment, 
that is a variant of the Third-party Punishment Game where the Recipient can punish the 
third party. We find that third parties are willing to punish dictators (Fehr and Fischbacher, 
2004; Ottone, 2008) and, in doing so, they are affected by ‘reference-dependent fairness’, 
rather than by the ‘egalitarian distribution norm’. By eliciting players’ normative 
expectations, it turns out that all of them expect a Dictator to transfer something – not half 
of the endowment. Consequently, the Observers’ levels of punishment are sensitive to their 
subjective sense of fairness. A positive relation between the level of punishment and the 
degree of negative subjective unfairness emerges. Subjective unfairness also affects 
Dictators’ behaviour: their actual transfers and their ideal transfer are not significantly 
different. Finally, we interestingly find that third parties are also sensitive to the receivers’ 
(credible) threat to punish them: as the Dictator’s transfer becomes lower and lower than 
the Observer’s ideal transfer, the Observer’s reaction is – other things being equal –   
significantly stronger in the Metanorm Treatment than in the Third-Party Punishment 
Game Treatment. Hence, despite their being to some extent genuinely nonstrategically 
motivated, also third parties – like second parties – are sensitive to the costs of punishing.  
 
Keywords: Third-Party Punishment; Moral Sentiments; Material Interests; Subjective 
Unfairness; Social Norms. 
 




1. Introduction     
Humans are the only species known to often incur costs in order to adopt various types of 
morally charged behaviors. In the last decades, experimental research has persuasively 
shown that the canonical model based on material self-interest only – the so called 
‘selfishness axiom’ – is untenable in literally hundreds of experiments carried out in 
several countries by means of a large number of different game protocols. However, on 
more constructive grounds, a lot of disagreement still exists about the exact features of 
both fairness judgments and non-selfish behaviors. As we will make clear, our 
experimental data show that the Homo Oeconomicus model fails in a variety of new ways, 
but also that subtle interplays turn out to interestingly occur between selfishness and pro-
sociality, in the domain of both individuals’ normative beliefs and actual behavioral 
decisions.  
In particular, we both confirm previous results and obtain new findings, with regard 
to the nature of unselfish behaviors acting as enforcement devices of a given ‘social norm 
of fairness’. Social norms are ubiquitous among humans and play a relevant role in 
virtually any human society (see Henrich et al., 2001). Notwithstanding this, they are still 
poorly understood, to the point that they still constitute one of the big unsolved problems in 
the behavioral sciences (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Experimental economics can 
contribute to greatly enhance our understanding of how social norms emerge and are 
endogenously enforced. Unlike field studies, properly designed experiments allow us to 
rigorously isolate the different forces shaping norm enforcement. 
In the lab, subjects have often proved to be willing to display altruistic  or 
nonstrategic punishment, that is forms of costly sanctioning which are not driven by (more 
or less sophisticated forms of) material payoff maximization
1. Hence, this mechanism 
represents a  potentially relevant endogenous norm enforcement device, especially within 
social environments where centralized institutions for the exogenous enforcement of legal 
rules are absent or ineffective. However, behavioral economics, so far, has mainly dealt 
with  second-party altruistic punishment, by focusing on the ‘vengeful’ behavior of 
experimental subjects who had been directly hurt by other players (see, e.g. the famous 
work by Fehr and Gaechter, 2000). By contrast, as Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) correctly 
                                                 
1 When nonstrategic sanctioning is both targeted at non-cooperators and associated with the willingness to 
cooperate with cooperators, such behavioral attitude is called strong reciprocity. For experimental evidence, 
see e.g. Fehr and Gaechter (2000) and the survey in Gintis et al. (2003). Strong reciprocity differs from the 
strategically motivated form of reciprocity which is typical of the so called ‘Folk Theorem’ literature (see e.g. 




observe, “if only second parties imposed sanctions, a very limited number of social norms 
could be enforced because norm violations often do not directly hurt other people” (p. 64). 
In other words, it is often the case that the enforcement of a given norm of fairness depends 
on the (nonstrategic) action of both second and third parties. People often punish 
wrongdoers and an altruistic third-party punisher is an agent who is willing to incur 
material costs in order to inflict harm on violators of a social norm, even when such 
violations are not directed at him.  
As Marlowe et al. (2008) observe: “Third-party punishment is an effective way to 
enforce the norms of strong reciprocity and promote cooperation”. According to Kurzban 
et al. (2007), third-party punishment is a crucial feature of human social life and forms the 
cornerstone of morality: “Humans everywhere seek and assess evidence of infractions, 
identify acts as morally right or wrong, and desire that wrongdoers be punished”
 2. (p. 75). 
Similarly, Carpenter and Matthews (2007) point out that “Although the logic of third-party 
punishment is not obvious, researchers have determined that it is crucial for the 
enforcement of social norms” (p. 2). They conclude their paper by highlighting that the 
emphasis on second-party punishment in the literature seems misplaced.  
The main problem with second-party punishment has to do with Kandori’s (1992) 
distinction between personal and community enforcement mechanisms. The classic 
literature on the Folk Theorem in repeated games provides us with formal models of 
personal enforcement, in which cheating triggers retaliation by the victim. Such 
mechanisms, also described as relying on ‘direct’ – rather than ‘indirect’ reciprocity 
(Nowak and Sygmund, 1998) – can be effective only if the same agents frequently play the 
same stage game over time. By contrast, under community enforcement agents change 
their partners over time and punishment can be interpreted as a consequence of the fact that 
the punisher knows that the opponent adopts a ‘bad’ behavior in general, that is whenever 
she interacts with others in the population, not only in her direct interactions with the 
punisher. The key point is that nowadays, within increasingly interdependent, large-scale 
societies, the level of anonymity increases and a growing number of interactions take the 
form of one-shot games. Hence, it would be hard to believe that, in such contexts, 
endogenous norm enforcement occurs extensively due to second-party punishment only: 
insofar as we consider complex social scenarios where cheating becomes tempting and 
                                                 
2 It is interesting to observe that some third-party punishment has been found also among nonhuman animals. 




difficult to monitor, third-party punishment is likely to be critically at work in preventing a 
decay of cooperation
3.         
However, despite the crucial role played by third parties in enforcing social norms 
in many real-life societies, the economics of third-party punishment – unlike second-party 
punishment studies – is still in its infancy, especially at experimental level
4. Notable 
exceptions are the recent works by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), Bernhard (2005), Shinada 
et al. (2005), Takahashi et al. (2005), Ottone (2005; 2008), Carpenter and Matthews (2006; 
2007), Bernhard et al. (2006), Henrich et al. (2006), Marlowe et al. (2008) and Charness et 
al. (2007).   
  As to altruistic third-party punishment, we claim that one of the key questions to be 
addressed can be stated as follows: what triggers this form of punishment? What motives 
underlie ‘uninvolved’ third parties’ willingness to incur costs in order to punish individuals 
who ‘defected’ on someone else? As Kurzban et al. (2007) observe: “Given that 
punishment is costly and can potentially draw retaliation, third-party punishment appears 
to be a tendency that would be selected against, raising the issue of how adaptations that 
give rise to moralistic punishment evolved” (p. 75). Takahashi et al. (2005) discover that 
also third-party punishment (like second-party punishment) is affected by the punisher’s 
evaluation of the punishee’s intentions, but in a way that significantly differs from what 
had been previously obtained in the domain of second-party sanctioning. The experimental 
works of Bernhard (2005), Bernhard et al. (2006), Henrich et al. (2006) and Marlowe et al. 
(2008) focus, inter alia, on third-party sanctioning across cultures. Bernhard et al. (2006) 
investigate the potentially parochial nature of altruistic norm enforcement by means of 
comparisons between third parties’ behavior towards ingroup and outgroup subjects, in 
order to see whether group membership affects the punishment patterns of ‘impartial’ 
observers. Within their well-known cross-cultural project, Henrich et al. (2006) find that 
there is considerable variance in the levels of third-party punishment. Marlowe et al. 
(2008) report new findings that explain such cross-cultural variation. Charness et al. (2007) 
explore the effects of third-party intervention in different treatments of an Investment 
Game and find a strong and significant effect of this sanctioning mechanism. Ottone 
(2008) implements a design where the third party has the opportunity to both punish the 
Dictator and transfer money to the Receiver (Solomon’s Game). What it turns out is that 
                                                 
3 Marlowe et al. (2008) interestingly provide an experimental confirmation of this intuition, as they find that 
subjects belonging to larger, more complex societies engage in significantly more third-party punishment 
than people in small-scale societies.  




the Observer’s transfers to the Receiver appear to be complementary to the punishment of 
the Dictator at high levels of unfairness and to be substitutes of it at low levels. This may 
suggest that the attitude of human beings to help those who suffer from an unfair behavior 
is strong and multifaceted – the desire of revenge is not the only emotion stimulated by 
people’s sense of justice. People care about the condition of the victims. 
The main purpose of this paper is to contribute to shed light on the motivational 
dimension underlying sanctioning decisions taken by uninvolved third parties. We begin 
by wondering whether some key findings obtained within the domain of second-party 
punishment also carry over to third-party punishment. Hence, we address the following 
questions: do people engage in third-party punishment? Are third parties driven by ‘moral 
sentiments’, that is sensitive to the ‘degree of unfairness’ of the punishees? Is third-party 
punishment entirely nonstrategic or is it also affected by ‘material interests’ (as second-
party punishment appears to be)?   
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the 
experimental design. Section 3 clarifies our experimental procedure. In Section 4 the 
theoretical predictions for our experimental game are derived. Section 5 contains our major 
results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental design      
The experimental design (Figure 1) consists of three treatments: the Dictator Game 
Treatment (DG), the Third-party Punishment Game Treatment (TPP) and the Metanorm 
Treatment (MN)
5. In the DG the tool is the classic Dictator Game. At the beginning of the 
session each subject is randomly assigned a role (A or B) and groups of 2 participants are 
formed. In each group, participant A (the Dictator) and participant B (the Receiver) play a 
Dictator Game. 
In the TPP, our vehicle is the ‘third-party punishment in the dictator game’ (TP-
DG) originally proposed by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004; p. 66), that is a DG in which a 
third player with a punishment option is introduced. At the beginning of the first stage each 
subject is randomly assigned a role (A, B or C) and groups of 3 participants are formed. In 
each group, participant A (the Dictator) and participant B (the Receiver) play a Dictator 
Game. In the second stage, participant C (the Observer) enters the game and has to decide 
                                                 




whether to bear a cost in order to sanction A or to keep the whole initial endowment
6. This 
design reflects the idea that violation of a given behavioral standard may be punished not 
only by second parties (participant B, in our design), but also by ‘uninvolved’ third parties 
(participant C).  
In the MN, we study a variant of the TPP based on the notion of metanorm 
(Axelrod, 1986). After that players participate in TPP, a third stage begins. In this stage 
participant B has the possibility to become an active player, by punishing participant C. 
The MN may be seen as a combination of the TPP and the well-known Ultimatum Game 
(UG; see Guth et al., 1982): like in the TPP, the Observer can punish the Dictator at a cost 
and, like in the UG, the Receiver can punish the ‘first party’. The key difference between 
the MN and the UG is that in the latter the Receiver can directly (though implicitly, that is 
by rejecting the offer) punish his coplayer
7, whereas in the former the Receiver is only 
allowed to indirectly punish the first party by punishing the Observer for not punishing 
(enough) the first party.  
In each treatment, A’s and C’s initial endowment is the same (20 tokens), while B’s 
initial endowment is 10 tokens. The cost for participant C to punish participant A for the 
amount of 2 tokens, is 1 token. In the MN, the cost for participant B to punish participant C 
for the amount of 2 tokens, is 1 token as well
8. Each token’s value is 0.50 Euro. 
 
3. Experimental procedure      
The experiment was run in the Experimental Economics Laboratory (EELAB), at the 
University of Milano-Bicocca in Milan, Italy. The experiment was programmed and 
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Overall, 2 sessions for each 
treatment were run, with a total of 157 participants (40 participants in the DG, 60 in the 
TPP, 57 in the MN), recruited through a web-based recruitment system. At the beginning 
of the experiment, participants were informed about the sequential nature of the game 
protocol. The instructions were read by participants on their computer screen while an 
experimenter read them loudly. After reading the instructions and before subjects were 
invited to take decisions, some control questions were asked in order to be sure that players 
understood the rules of the game. At the end of each session, subjects were asked to fill in 
                                                 
6 It is important to make clear that, as it is customary in economic experiments on punishment, the 
instructions did not contain terms such as punish  or  sanction, but used instead the more neutral term 
deduction. 
7 The UG can then be seen as the most famous example of experimental analysis of second-party sanctions. 




a brief survey to check for socio-demographic data. Each subject participated in one 
session only and partners’ identities were unknown even when the experiment was over. 
The strategy method at the Observer’s stage was implemented
9. Each session lasted for 
about 20 minutes for the DG, 40 minutes for the TPP, and about 50 minutes for the MN. 
Each subject earned on average 7.4 Euros. 
 
 
4. Predictions   
  In this section we derive the theoretical predictions about subjects’ behavioral 
decisions for our experimental game. First, we illustrate the economic prediction based on 
the assumption that players are rational, driven by classic material self-interest and that it is 
common knowledge that this is the case. Then, we present the predictions of recently 
developed social preference theories. 
 
 
4.1. Prediction based on the ‘selfishness axiom’ 
 
In the TPP, we expect that rational, selfish third parties never punish, since subjects 
never meet one another more than once and punishment is costly for them. For the same 
reason, under common knowledge, the same expectation holds for both Observers and 
Receivers in the MN. In other words, our design completely rules out the possibility of 
both self-interested third-party sanctions and self-interested punishment on the part of 
rational Observers and Receivers in the MN. Then, we also expect that, in all three 
treatments, if we assume that common knowledge holds and that, hence, A believes that C 
and (in the MN) B are selfish (so that their threat to punish is considered an incredible 
one), a selfish Dictator transfers nothing to the Receiver. As a consequence, under the 
above assumptions, the following subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes are predicted, in 
the three treatments: zero transfer by A in the DG; zero transfer by A and zero punishment 
by C in the TPP and zero transfer by A and zero punishment by both C and B in the MN. 
 
                                                 
9 When the strategy method is used, subjects are asked to state their decision in correspondence of each 
possible case. In our experiment, this meant that C was asked to indicate the number of deduction points for 
each of A’s possible transfer levels before knowing A’s actual choice. The final payoff was then determined 
on the basis of A’s actual choice. In order to help Cs to think carefully about their decisions, an overview of 
the resulting payoffs has been made available (see Appendix 3). Several tests in simple games have not found 
behavior induced by the strategy method to be significantly different from behavior induced by the standard 
direct-response method (Charness et al., 2007). Also in Henrich et al. (2006) the strategy method was used 





4.2. Predictions based on social preference theories 
Let us now turn to the predictions to which recently developed social preference 
theories lead. According to the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model, based on the assumption 
that individuals dislike inequality, only in the DG transfers from player A to player B (if ȕ 
> 0.5) are possible, while both in the TPP and in the MN neither transfer nor punishment 
are predicted. We obtain the same results if we consider the models of Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) and Charness and Rabin (2002).  
To sum up, according to Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and 
Charness and Rabin (2002) we expect positive transfer levels in the DG only, while 
nothing is predicted in the other two treatments. 
5. Results      
In this section we present our major results. In particular, we focus on three relevant 
points. Of first note is the finding that the baseline data are qualitatively similar to results 
reported in previous works. Second, we wonder whether what we identify as players’ 
subjective reference principle of fairness (i.e. the subjective perception of fairness 
emerging by eliciting players’ normative beliefs) influences people’s behavior. Finally, we 
investigate the effect of metanorms on third parties’ choices. On the whole, we claim that, 
analogously to Gaechter and Riedl (2004), there are two dimensions to this empirical 
assessment. The first dimension is the moral or normative intuition that people have on 
what they think a fair solution is, with regard to transfer levels in a Dictator Game. To this 
goal, agents’ normative judgments over the fair transfer level by the Dictator are elicited. 
We do this for all the subjects, by considering all player roles and all the three treatments 
composing our experiment. The second dimension is actual behavior that may or may not 
be influenced by fairness considerations.  
The results we obtain provide empirical evidence on both the normative and the 
behavioral dimension. More specifically, as far as our analysis of players’ behavioral 
decisions are concerned, we ask whether a relationship between normative judgments and 
actual punishing choices exists, on the part of third parties. To this end, we compare 
Observers’ punishment pattern in the TPP and in the MN, in order to check whether 
significant differences emerge, once the principle of fairness that we elicit by focusing on 
normative beliefs is taken into account.  
 





Result 1. In line with the existing experimental literature, in the TPP the Observer’s level 
of punishment decreases as the Dictator’s transfers increase. A similar negative 
correlation emerges in the MN 
As far as the TPP is concerned, this result (see Figure 2) is perfectly in line with the 
experimental evidence obtained in other works (see for instance Fehr and Fischbacher, 
2004
10; Bernhard, 2005; Ottone, 2005, 2008). Our data indicate that this negative 
correlation between the Observer’s level of punishment and the Dictator’s level of transfers 
holds also in the MN. A random-effects Tobit regression (see Appendix 2) of punishment 
on the Dictator’s transfer confirms that a positive relation exists between the level of 
punishment and the degree of unfairness (DISTANCE, p = 0.000). 
 
5.2 Subjective unfairness  
After that subjects’ decisions are taken, their first-order normative beliefs are 
elicited
11. By doing this, our goal is to provide an answer to the following question: what 
are the normative views that players hold about the fair division? 
 In particular, each player is asked to identify her ideal transfer from the Dictator to 
the Receiver (see Table 3). This allows to investigate two relevant points. Firstly, we can 
check whether our agents, while playing different roles in the games, share a common 
norm of fairness and whether such norm significantly differs or not from the egalitarian 
one. Secondly, we can study whether the norm of fairness that we identify by eliciting 
subjects’ normative beliefs affects their punishment patterns in the two punishment 
treatments we consider (TPP and MN). 
 
Result 2. People share a common norm of fairness such as ‘selfishness aversion’, rather 
than an ‘egalitarian’ one 
If we compare the average right transfers according to the Dictators, we find out that 
there is no significant difference along the treatments (Kruskall-Wallis test; p = 0.55). The 
same is true if we compare the average right transfers according to both the Recipients and 
the Observers along the treatments (Kruskall –Wallis test,  p = 0.15; Mann-Whitney test, p 
                                                 
10 In particular, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) find that almost two-thirds of the third parties indeed punished 
the violation of the distribution norm and that their punishment increased the more the norm was violated. 
11 Bernhard et al. (2006), in their third-party punishment experiments, elicit players’ empirical expectations 
about how the dictators would be punished at different transfer levels, but they do not elicit players’ 




= 0.22). This means that players’ ideal ‘right’ transfer is not influenced by the experimental 
game they play. 
When we compare different participants’ normative beliefs to check whether the role  
they are called upon to play is relevant in determining people’s perception of fairness, it 
turns out that the Recipients’ right transfer is significantly higher than the Dictators’ and 
the Observers’ ones (ttest, p = 0.0002 and p = 0.0038 respectively). On the other hand, 
Dictators’ and Observers’ beliefs are aligned (ttest, p = 0.69). However, we find that, 
regardless of their role, the players share the idea that the right transfer from the Dictator to 
the Receiver is significantly different from both 0 (the selfish choice) and 5 (the egalitarian 
choice). We call this subjective norm of fairness ‘selfishness aversion’. For a more detailed 




Result 3. The subjective perception of fairness plays a relevant role in people’s decisional 
process: third parties display reference-dependent fairness 
During the experiment the Observers were asked to identify their ideal transfer from 
the Dictator to the Receiver (see Table 3). If we view such ideal transfer as a subjective 
reference point of fairness, each Dictator’s transfer lower than the ideal transfer may be 
considered unfair on the part of the Observer. In this light, it seems natural to analyze the 
Observer’s reaction when her subjective principle of fairness is violated, in order to see 
whether third parties display a form of ‘reference-dependent fairness’, in their punishment 
pattern. 
What turns out is that in the TPP the Observers’ levels of punishment are sensitive to 
their subjective sense of fairness. In Figure 3 the relation between the (subjectively 
perceived) unfairness of Dictators and the level of punishment from the Observer to the 
Dictator is depicted. It is clear that the level of punishment increases as the Dictator’s 
transfer becomes lower and lower than the Observer’s ideal transfer: the Observers’ 
perceived sense of fairness is reference-dependent. A random-effects Tobit regression (see 
Appendix 2) of punishment on the variables Negative Subjective Unfairness
13 confirms the 
existence of a positive relation between the level of punishment and the degree of negative 
subjective unfairness (ǻNEG,  p  = 0.000). From Figure 3 it emerges also that some 
                                                 
12 A series of Wilcoxon tests is performed to check whether, for all player roles, the ideal transfer from the 
Dictator to the Receiver is different from 0 and from 5. In all cases, p = 0.000. 




punishment still exists even when the Dictator transfers to the Receiver a sum which is 
higher than the Observer’s ideal transfer. However, by regressing punishment on the 
variable Positive Subjective Unfairness
14, we see that such relationship turns out not to be 
significant (ǻPOS, p = 0.18).  
Also the Dictators appear to be affected by reference-dependent fairness, in choosing 
their transfer levels: if we compare their actual transfers to their ideal transfer, there is no 
significant difference (ttest, p = 0.33). 
 
5.3 Metanorms  
 
Result 4. When violations of subjective fairness occur, third-party punishment is harsher 
in the MN than in the TPP 
When we add the possibility for the Receiver to punish the Observer (e.g. if s/he 
thinks s/he did not sanction enough an unfair Dictator), the Observers’ behavior seems not 
to change (see Figure 2). If we compare the Observer’s level of punishment at each level of 
the Dictator’s transfer (see Table 1), we find out that there is no significant difference 
(Mann-Whitney test; p > 0.14). A random-effects Tobit regression confirms this result 
(MN, p = 0.35). 
However, when we focus on third parties’ reference-dependent fairness, that is on the 
Observers’ behavior when their principle of fairness is violated, it emerges that when the 
Dictator’s transfer becomes lower and lower than the Observer’s ideal transfer, the 
Observer’s reaction is significantly stronger in the MN (ǻNEG*MN, p = 0.000; see Figure 
3, on this). 
 
 
6. Discussion  
 
Third parties are willing to nonstrategically punish Dictators 
 
Our analysis confirms Fehr and Fischbacher’s (2004) major findings: most of third parties 
indeed punish ‘unfair’ Dictators and the amount of punishment is negatively related to the 
level of Dictators’ transfers (Result 1). Hence, we confirm that the notion of strong 
negative reciprocity extends to the sanctioning behavior of ‘unaffected’ third parties. 
Further, we reach a similar conclusion by passing from the TPP to the MN treatment. Like 
                                                 




Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), and unlike several experimental designs, we focus on one-
shot interactions, so that punishment in the TPP cannot be strategically motivated by the 
desire to induce higher contributions from other subjects in later periods. In other words, 
our design allows us to isolate nonstrategic sanctioning. Further, we interestingly find that 
both third parties’ propensity to costly punish and the existence of a negative correlation 
between the amount of punishment and the level of Dictators’ transfers hold not only by 
considering ‘objective’ fairness (Result 1), but also when we focus on players’ subjective 
fairness (Results 3 and 4).     
 
 
Players share a common norm of fairness such as ‘selfishness aversion’, rather than an 
‘egalitarian’ one 
Social norms constitute standards of behavior based on widely shared beliefs on how 
individuals ought to behave in a given situation (Elster, 1989). Our results show that, when 
the experimental game takes the form of the well-known Dictator Game, experimental 
players do not subjectively perceive as ‘fair’ the so called ‘egalitarian distribution norm’ 
(see Result 2)
15. While we confirm the previous finding that subjects are (altruistically) 
willing to enforce a norm of fairness even though the enforcement is costly for them, a 
subjectively perceived norm of fairness (i) exists, (ii) is to some extent shared by all the 
players across treatments but (iii) clearly differs from a purely egalitarian norm of fairness. 
Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) hypothesize that the salient distribution norm in the Dictator 
Game is the equal split, that is for A to transfer half of the ‘pie’ to B, arguing that since the 
players interact anonymously and are randomly assigned their roles, there is no reason why 
A should end up with more money than B. They also elicit fairness judgments which 
clearly indicated that the egalitarian solution is perceived to be the fair solution. Bernhard 
et al.’s (2006) experimental study was designed  to capture the altruistic enforcement of 
egalitarian sharing norms documented by ethnographic studies (see e.g. Boehm, 1993). As 
they observe, such sharing norms appear to be beneficial to the group as they insure their 
members against the uncertainties in individual food acquisition success. Their data reveal 
that there is little punishment at and above the egalitarian level, while ‘unfair’ proposals 
are more heavily sanctioned the more the Dictator deviates from the ‘equality norm’. They 
                                                 
15 The fact that subjects’ sense of fairness is context-dependent was clear also in Ottone (2008). When 
participants have to earn their endowment, the Observers both punish and transfer less than when the 
endowment is randomly assigned. This may imply that the fairness reference point changes as the situation 




conclude that “This finding suggests the existence of an egalitarian sharing norm in all four 
conditions (…). The third parties’ and the dictators’ beliefs further support this 
interpretation” (p. 913). By contrast, we reach a different conclusion as, by eliciting 
players’ normative beliefs, we find that all of them expect a Dictator to give something, not 
to give half of his endowment to the Receiver. In other words, it turns out from our 
experiment that there is a salient distribution norm, but also that such norm differs from 
the equality norm. We also find that players appear to be consistent in this normative 
evaluation across treatments. In our view, all this means that in all treatments Dictators, 
Observers and Receivers believe that, if you happen to play as a Dictator, playing entirely 
selfishly is unfair. However, we interestingly also see that fairness is subjectively 
perceived by all of them not egalitarianly but as selfishness aversion: while all the players 
agree that Dictators should avoid to keep the whole amount for themselves, they do not 
believe that splitting the pie equally is morally compulsory.  
 
Are fairness norms socio-economically and culturally-specific? 
A possible interpretation of the remarkable difference between our finding and Bernhard et 
al.’s result has to do with the fact that our subjects are university students, rather than 
indigenous group members living in Papua New Guinea. In other words, the point here, 
while speculative, is that when people’s life priority is to survive, then sharing rules are 
essential to this. As a consequence, the egalitarian distribution norm becomes salient 
within such groups, as widely documented by ethnographic studies. On the contrary, within 
wealthy societies in which primary needs have to some extent been satisfied, people are 
driven by a ‘less extreme’ norm of fairness – what we term ‘selfishness aversion’. Such 
interesting difference, due to a combination of socio-economic and cultural motives, 
appears to be in line with the more general finding obtained in the last years by cross-
cultural experimental research (see e.g. Henrich et al., 2001), that is the even larger 
behavioral variability observed after expanding the diversity of cultural and economic 
circumstances of experimental subjects, compared to previous experiments mainly 





Receivers’ right transfer is significantly higher than Dictators’ and Observers’ right 
transfer 
As far as players’ normative beliefs are concerned, let us finally observe that a remarkable 
difference between Receivers and the other two players exists: Receivers’ right transfer is 
significantly higher than Dictators’ and Observers’ ones. This interestingly seems to 
suggest that when normative evaluations about what is fair within a given game protocol 
are asked to players involved in it, a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’ would be necessary in 
order to elicit genuinely ‘impartial’ views about ‘what is fair’ from the players. By 
borrowing Loewenstein’s (2000) well-known notion of ‘hot-cold’ empathy gap, we may 
speculatively argue that, in a TPP, both the Dictator and the Receiver are in a ‘hot state’, 
while the third party is, by definition, in a ‘cold state’. Hence her normative judgments 
should reflect the viewpoint of an impartial spectator, due to her being a ‘financially 
uninvolved’ third party. We find that even though they are in a different state in making 
their normative judgments, Dictators’ and Observers’ normative beliefs are aligned. By 
contrast, Receivers’ higher levels of right transfer are in line with their being in a ‘hot 
state’. We may conclude that if the ‘hot-cold’ empathy gap strongly affects normative 
evaluations in a well-controlled laboratory environment, such distinction is likely to play 
an even more important role in outside-lab economic interactions. 
 
 
When subjective fairness is taken into account, Observers’ punishment is both nonstrategic 
and strategically motivated 
Why do people costly punish others, when sanctioning yields neither present nor future 
material benefits? Fehr and Gaechter (2002) assert that negative emotions such as anger 
could be the proximate mechanism toward punishment. However, as Anderson and 
Putterman (2006) point out: “Although the presence of anger need not rule out systematic 
behavioral rules (…) if taken to its limit, the emotion approach might suggest behaviour 
which is simply not amenable to rational analysis” (p. 2). Anderson and Putterman’s 
experiment tests whether the demand for punishment displays the usual downward slope 
with respect to price; hence, it also indirectly tests “whether a rational choice-with-social-
tastes characterization, or an irrational anger description, is more accurate” (p. 3). Their 
analysis provides evidence that (i) nonstrategic punishment of free riders is common and 




purchased is a decreasing function of the price). Therefore, a ‘rational choice-with-social-
tastes’ characterization of punishers emerges from their study. 
      With regard to the nature of Observers’ punishment in our experiment, it is interesting 
to ask a qualitatively similar question: is their attitude towards punishment entirely 
nonstrategic? In principle it is not clear whether punishment behavior underlies non-
standard preferences or a relevant influence of emotional factors. While we cannot rule out 
that both factors are at work, our overall results tend to favor the first interpretation, as we 
find that Observers’ punishment appears to be partially strategically motivated. More 
specifically, we can reject the hypothesis that punishing subjects are driven by non-rational 
factors (such as anger) – acting as ‘moral sentiments’ – only, since the agents playing as 
Observers in the MN are sensitive to the presence of potential punishers (i.e. the 
Receivers). In particular, insofar as the Observers see ‘selfishness aversion’ as the salient 
triggering norm, we find that such agents are not fully nonstrategically motivated, as the 
concern over the possibility of being punished by the Receivers seems to serve to 
discipline them and induces them to punish significantly more (see Result 4)
16.     
This result appears to be in line with the more general finding obtained so far by 
experimental studies on sanctioning, that is the ordinary good nature of punishment. 
Anderson and Putterman (2006), through a series of experiments in which they randomly 
vary the cost of reducing the earnings of other group members following voluntary 
contribution decisions, show that the impulse to nonstrategically punish others is sensitive 
to the cost to the punisher. While we cannot reach exactly the same conclusion – as the 
costs of punishing do not vary in our experiment – we broadly confirm their general 
qualitative finding: even when it has a nonstrategic nature, punishment is sensitive to 
costs
17. More specifically, while existing experiments characterize nonstrategic punishment 
as an ordinary good when the punisher is not a third party, we find that also third parties 
appear to be sensitive to the ‘price’ of altruistic punishment.  
                                                 
16 However, while economics and game theory have traditionally favored ‘consequentialist’ interpretations of 
agents’ behavior, it is important to make clear that, in principle, we cannot rule out that the Observers are 
also sensitive to social presence per se (see, on this, Kurzban et al., 2007) in the MN. In other words, in this 
context their increased punishment may be due to psychological and/moral reasons such as guilt aversion or 
the desire not to disappoint the Receivers, whose presence is made ‘active’ by the design of MN. The 
inclusion in the design of the MN of ‘victims of unfairness’ endowed with a punishing option may make such 
‘social presence’ salient in the eyes of the Observers, in line with a thesis advanced in social psychology and 
often associated with the notion of so called ‘moralistic punishment’.  
17 This also parallels Andreoni and Miller’s (2002) finding, that is the consistency between altruistic behavior 
and rationality, as well as Carpenter’s (2007) result that the demand for punishment is negatively related to 
its ‘price’. Another experimental study documenting an inverse relationship between costs and frequency of 





On the nature of the Observers’ reasoning 
We can interestingly shed further light on player C’s behavior across treatments by 
laying stress on the fact that, in the MN, B’s potential punishment of C is entirely 
nonstrategic. In other words, such potential punishment turns out to be credible (as it 
affects C’s punishment behavior) even though it is nonstrategic. Why does this occur? 
Why are players C affected by the possibility to be punished by Bs, if they know that Bs’ 
potential punishment is nonstrategic? A possible explanation is that players C do not 
clearly understand that Bs’ punishment is nonstrategic. A second interpretation is the 
following: players C know that Bs’ potential sanctioning is nonstrategic; however, such 
sanctioning is credible, as they know that people can decide to nonstrategically punish 
others, as they are willing to do towards Dictators. This would mean that players C are 
willing to punish nonstrategically others, but they are also (consistently) afraid to be 
punished nonstrategically. In other words, it is interesting to find that players C are 
affected by both nonstrategic and strategic considerations in their punishment choices 
towards A and that the strategic component of their reasoning is crucially affected by 
(potential) nonstrategic punishment on the part of players B. On the whole, we then find 
that interesting and complex interplays between strategic and nonstrategic considerations 
take place, when ‘rational’ players displaying ‘non-selfish’ behavior are involved. 
 
 
Comparison with proximate theories of social preferences 
If we referred exclusively to the models of social preferences mentioned in Section 
4, the data that come out from our experiment could not be satisfactorily explained. First of 
all, we expected transfers from A to B only in the Dictator Game. In our experiment, the 
positive level of transfer in the three treatments is not statistically different. Moreover, the 
level of transfer from A to B that subjects consider fair does not vary across treatments. 
Second, subjects C punish in TPP and in MN while the theoretical predictions in the 
models mentioned above do not consider intervention. 
A possible explanation for these results could be that subjects’ consideration of the 
others changes as their role changes. As argued by Fehr and Schmidt (2006), the relative 
relevance of each player in a game is an open issue. In order to understand the behavior of 
our players, we may hypothesize that some subjects A reveal a great interest in the 




same time, some players C could be not interested in their own payoff when they have to 
decide to punish or not subject A. Subjects C, in this case, could feel as a judge in the 
relationship between A and B. Moreover, we may think that C puts herself in B’s shoes 
and reacts to an unfair transfer of A as if she were acting as a Receiver in an Ultimatum 
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 Fig. 2   Observer’s behavior 
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Fig. 3 Subjective Unfairness  
 
 
Table 1.  




0 1 2 3 4 5 
TPP  2  1.75  1.35 1.3 0.95  0.85 
MN  2.05 1.79 1.37 0.89 0.68 0.58 
Mann-Whitney 
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(2) = (3) 
= (4) 
t- test  
(2) = (3) 
(3) = (4) 
(2) = (4)  
DG  1.4 1.5 3.1     
p =0 .0002
p = 0.0038
p =0 .69 
TPP  1.55 1.85  3  2  p =0 .11 
MN  1.53  1.42 2.1 1.42  p =0 .35 
Kruskall - Wallis 
test 








  Percentage of 
cases of  0  1  2 3 4 5 
            
DG 
Dictators who 
transfer…  40% 15%  25%  10%  5%  5% 
Dictators who 
think the right 
transfer is … 
30% 20%  30%  15%  0%  5% 
Recipients who 
think the right 
transfer is… 
5%  10%  30%  15% 5% 35% 
Observers who 
think the right 
transfer is … 
-  -  - - - - 
           
TPP 
Dictators who 
transfer…  30% 20%  25%  20%  0%  5% 
Dictators who 
think the right 
transfer is … 
30%  10%  25%  25% 0% 10% 
Recipients who 
think the right 
transfer is … 
10%  0%  40%  15% 0% 35% 
Observers who 
think the right 
transfer is … 
25% 5%  30%  30%  5%  5% 
           
MN 
Dictators who 
transfer…  21%  42%  21% 0% 11% 5% 
Dictators who 
think the right 
transfer is … 
32% 26%  32%  0%  0%  11% 
Recipients who 
think the right 
transfer is … 
26%  11%  32%  11% 0% 21% 
Observers who 
think the right 
transfer is … 






Appendix 2 – The econometric analysis 
 
i i i i i GENDER AGE MN DISTANCE P H E E E E E        4 3 2 1 0  
(S1) 
 






Dependent variable: punishment (Pi) 
Random-effects Tobit regression – censored at the low level (0) 
 
Variables                                     S1                                    S2 
 
DISTANCE   0.57***     - 
 (0.087)   
ǻNEG       -  0.684*** 
    (0.164)     
ǻPOS       -  -0.19 
   (0.14)   
MN -0.625 
 (0.673) 
ǻNEG *MN    0.882*** 
   (0.239) 
ǻPOS *MN    -0.044 
   (0.20) 
AGE 0.092  -0.02 
 (0.13)  (0.138) 
GENDER -0.30  0.063 
 (0.72)  (0.688) 
Constant -2.9  0.075 
 (2.77)  (2.787) 
 
n 39  39     
T 6  6 
N 234 234   
 
Log Likelihood  -280.68683  -261.51373 
 
Sigma_u 3.2***  2.6*** 










Name Descripton  Mean Standard 
Deviation  Min   Max 
DISTANCE  5 – transfer from A to B  2.5  1.711  0  5 
ǻNEG  max {0, Ideal Transfer – 
Actual Transfer}  0.59 1.093  0  5 
ǻPOS  max {0, Actual Transfer  
– Ideal  Transfer}  1.37 1.589  0  5 
MN 
Dummy variable equal to 
1 if the observation 
belongs to the MN 
- .501 0  1 
ǻNEG*MN 
Variable equal to max {0, 
Ideal Transfer – Actual 
Transfer} if the 
observation belongs to 
the MN; otherwise 0 
0.25 0.791  0  5 
ǻPOS*MN 
Variable equal to max {0, 
Actual Transfer  – Ideal  
Transfer} if the 
observation belongs to 
the MN; otherwise 0 
0.77 1.419  0  5 
AGE  Age 20.6  2.173  18  26 
GENDER  Dummy variable equal to 
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